JONES V. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.,
124 S. CT. 1836 (2004) by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 10
Winter 1-1-2005
JONES V. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO., 124
S. CT. 1836 (2004)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
JONES V. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO., 124 S. CT. 1836 (2004), 11 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J. 229 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol11/iss1/10
JONES V. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.,
124 S. CT. 1836 (2004)
FACTS
When enacted in 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided that "all persons.
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . .as enjoyed by white citizens."' Section 1981 was amended
multiple times 2 and significantly amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.'
The 1991 amendment overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union,4 which held that racial harassment relating to
employment conditions "[was] not actionable under § 1981 because . . .[
1981] does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a
contract."5 The 1991 amendment created causes of action for discriminatory
practices occurring during and after contract formation.6 The amendment
specifically defined the term "make and enforce contracts" to include "the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship. 
7
Similar to many federal statutes, § 1981, as amended, does not
prescribe a specific statute of limitations.8 In 1990, Congress enacted 28
U.S.C § 1658, which prescribed a four-year statute of limitations for civil
actions arising under an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990.9
The issue in this case was whether § 1658's four-year statute of limitations
applied to the 1991 amendment.' 0
Edith Jones, an African-American, is a former employee of R. R.
Donnelley & Sons Company (Respondent)." On November 26, 1994, Ms.
I Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1839-40 (2004).
2 Id. at 1839. The original version of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. It was amended in minor respects in 1870 and recodified in 1874, but its basic coverage did
not change prior to 1991. Id.
3 Id.
4 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In Patterson, the Court considered
whether damages sought by an employee for racial discrimination in employment conditions were
actionable under § 1981. Id. at 171. Petitioner, a black woman, was employed by respondent for ten years
until she was laid off, and she brought an action under § 1981 for workplace discrimination. Id. at 169.
The Court found that the employee's racial harassment claim was not actionable under § 1981, "because
that provision does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not
interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations." Id. at 171.
5 See Id. at 171 (holding that racial harassment relating to employment conditions was not
actionable under § 1981).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1981(h) (2003).
7 Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1840 (2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1981(b) (2003), which states "[flor the purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts'
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.").
8 Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1839.
9 Id. at 1841.
10 Id. at 1839.
11 Id.
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Jones, on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated persons
(Petitioners), filed a class action suit against Respondent claiming violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.12
Particularly, Petitioners accused Respondent of creating hostile work
environments, discriminatory job promotion, and wrongful termination or
denial of transfer when Respondent's Chicago plant closed. 13 These alleged
violations are actionable only under the 1991 amended version of § 1981.14
Respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
applicable state two-year statute of limitations on discrimination cases had
run. 15 Petitioners argued that the state statute of limitations did not govern
their causes of action because they arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which
provides a four-year statute of limitations for all federal laws enacted after
December 1, 1990.16 The United State District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, in an interlocutory order, held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as
amended, was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658; therefore, the statute of
limitations had not run on Petitioners' claims because the alleged violations
of § 1981 occurred less than four years prior to the filing of claims against
Respondent. 17 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed,' 8 concluding that § 1658 applies only when an act of Congress
creates a wholly new statutory cause of action, and the 1991 amendments did
not do so. 19
The Seventh Circuit's decision, which was consistent with decisions
from the Third and Eighth Circuits, reasoned that § 1658 does not apply to a
20cause of action based on post-1990 amendments to a pre-existing statute.
In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held
that § 1658 applies whenever Congress, after December 1990, passes
legislation that creates a new cause of action, whether or not the legislation
amends a pre-existing statute.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the circuit split.22  Specifically, the Court sought to determine
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1840.
15 Id. at 1839.
16 Id.
' Id. at 1840-41 (citing Adams v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 459 (ND 111.
2001)).
19 Id. at 1840 (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 305 F.3d 717, 728 (7th Cir. 2002)
rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004)).
19 Id. at 1840 (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 305 F.3d 717, 726 (7th Cir. 2002)
rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004)).20 Id. at 1841.
21 Id. (citing Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2002); Anthony v. BTR
Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 2003)).
22 Id. at 1841.
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whether Petitioners' § 1981 causes of action were governed by § 1658 and
whether the statute of limitations had run on those claims.23
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of the United States held that Petitioners' causes
of action, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658 and not by the
personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state.24 Therefore,
Petitioners' discrimination claims were not barred by the running of the state
two-year statute of limitations, and Respondent's motion of summary
judgment was denied.25 The Court reversed and remanded the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
26
ANALYSIS
Justice Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.27 The
Court began its analysis with the legislative history of § 1981, to determine
whether Petitioners' causes of action arose under the 1991 amendments to §
1981 or under § 1981 as originally enacted.28 The original version of § 1981
provided that all persons within the United States shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts as white citizens. 29 This right to contract did not
protect against harassing conduct during and after the formation of the
contract. 30 Therefore, the Court found that Petitioners' causes of action for
hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, and refusal to transfer did not
allege violations of the original version of § 1981 but rather arose solely
under the 1991 amendments. 3'
Neither party disputed that the 1991 amendments to § 1981
constitute an "Act of Congress," but the Court found that the meaning of the
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1845.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1846. The case is subsequently in the settlement process, and on October 21, 2004,
Respondent announced that it received preliminary approval of a settlement agreement with Petitioners
from Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division. Under the agreement, Respondent will pay $15 million to Petitioners and their lawyers.
In the settlement, Respondent does not admit to any of the allegations of wrongdoing and Petitioners must
release Respondent from all discrimination claims. Press Release, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company
(October 21, 2004) available at http://www.rrdonnelly.com/wwwRRD/News/2004News.asp (last visited
Feb. 10,2005).
27 Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2004).
28 Id. at 1839-40.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1840 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).
31 Id.
20051
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term "arising under" is ambiguous. 32 The Court explained that there are three
possible interpretations of "arising under:" (1) the case could have arisen
under § 1981; (2) the case could have arisen under the amendments to §
1981; or (3) the case could have arisen under both the original statute and the
amendments.33 The Court concluded that because § 1658 is facially
ambiguous, it must look past the plain text of § 1658 to ascertain
Congressional intent.34
The Court recognized the difficulties of applying state statutes of
limitations to federal causes of action, especially in nationwide class action
cases. 35 Specifically, the Court noted that before § 1658's enactment, "[t]he
settled practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations generated a host of
issues, such as which of the forum State's statutes was the most appropriate,
whether the forum State's law or that of the situs of the injury controlled, and
when a statute of limitations could be tolled."36 The Court concluded that
these problems prompted Congress to enact § 1658 to provide a uniform
federal statute of limitations for claims arising under federal statutes.37 The
Court further mentioned that "[t]he House Report accompanying the final bill
confirms that Congress was keenly aware of the problems associated with the
practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations, and that a central purpose
of § 1658 was to minimize the occasions for that practice.
3 8
The Court noted that this interpretation of Congressional intent is
best because it alleviates uncertainty created by borrowing state statute of
limitations in federal claims, is consistent with the common usage of the
word "arise," and is consistent with the Court's interpretation of "arising
under," as that phrase is used in statutes governing the scope of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. 39 Furthermore, the Court found that "[n]othing in
the text or history of § 1658 supports an interpretation that would limit its
reach to entirely new sections of the United States Code.'' The Court
reasoned that statutes are routinely amended, and amendments create new
causes of action that the original statutes do not cover, and to limit § 1658 to
statutes that were completely new and passed after December 1, 1990, would
not be in accordance with Congressional intent.4' Congress intended to set a
standard statute of limitations for federal causes of action and, "[w]hat
32 Id. at 1841.
33 Id. at 1842.
4 Id.
35 Id. at 1842-44.
36 Id. at 1843.




41 Id. at 1844-45.
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matters is the substantive effect of an enactment ... not the format in which
it appears in the code. '42  The Court concluded that a cause of action is
governed by § 1658's four-year statute of limitations if the plaintiff's claim
against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment.43
Applying its findings to the facts of this case, the Court held that
Petitioners' causes of action arose under the 1991 amendments to § 1981, "in
the sense that [P]etitioners' causes of action were made possible by [the]
[amendments]. '"44 The Court noted again that the 1991 amendments to §
1981 overturned Patterson,45 by enlarging the key "make and enforce
contracts" language of § 1981 to include acts occurring after contract
formation. 46 The Court added that it had previously held that the 1991
amendments expanded "the category of conduct that is subject to § 1981
liability. '47 That holding supports the conclusion that the 1991 amendments
constitute an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990, and therefore
are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658 for statute of limitations purposes.48
CONCLUSION
The holding in this case creates two separate statutes of limitations for
federal causes of action that arise under a statute as originally enacted and
under amendments to that statute. The causes of action under the original
statute will have the applicable state statute of limitations while the causes of
action arising under the amendment to the statute will be subject to the four-
year statute of limitations under § 1658. These different statutes of
limitations may have little practical effect on § 1981 claims, as the majority
of those claims concern harassment that occurs after contract formation, and
therefore fall under the 1991 amendments to § 198 1.4 9 Nonetheless,
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1845.
4 Id.
45 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171(1989).
4 Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1845-46 (2004).
47 Id. at 1846 (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 303).
4 Id.
49 See Boyd A. Byers, Adventures in Topsy-Turvy Land: Are Civil Rights Claims Arising Under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 Governed by the Federal Four-Year "Catch-All" Statute of Limitations, 28 U.S.C. §
1658?, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 509, 520 (1999) (stating "[tioday, most section 1981 claims arise in the
employment context... employment discrimination based on race is also prohibited by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) which makes it unlawful to 'discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The analysis and proof
structure under section 1981 is generally the same as in Title VII. Unlike Title VII, however, a plaintiff is
not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim under section 1981. Further,
section 1981 provides a longer statute of limitations than the 180-or 300-day period to file a charge with
the EEOC. Section 1981 thus provides a 'safety net' to race discrimination plaintiffs who miss their Title
VII statute of limitations or fail to exhaust Title VH's administrative process."') (citations omitted).
2005]
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[C]ourts would be required to determine what parts of a section
1981 claim arise under the statute as originally written and what
parts arise under the amendment and apply a different limitations
period to each. In fact, two separate statutes of limitations would
exist for every civil statute enacted prior to December 1, 1990, and
subsequently amended to create a new claim. This would impose
uncertainty on litigants, thereby defeating Congress's intent to
simplify the law and clarify the applicable statute of limitations by
enacting section 1658.50
This problem may be substantial, and is also ironic, as the Court specifically
looked to Congressional intent when discussing § 1658 and determined that
Congress desired uniformity and clarity regarding statute of limitations
issues. This holding creates additional analysis that courts must conduct in
determining the correct statute of limitations to apply, and therefore does not
further Congress's goal of uniformity or clarity.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Seth Steed
50 Id. at 547-48.
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